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UNDERSTANDING THE OBJECTIVE: PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
CERI WARNOCK 
A resource consent application for land use might encounter opposition by 
respondents who claim that the proposed activity will cause them to suffer 
psychologically. For example, opponents may fear that a proposed activity 
risks damaging their health and that they will suffer from unacceptable levels 
of anxiety if the application is consented to, or an activity may offend their 
moral sensibilities and as a consequence they feel anger and disgust. 
Psychological effects are a valid resource management concern but the case 
law on this issue appears inconsistent. This article considers the seeming 
contradictions in the way that psychological effects are accounted for in 
resource management decision-making in New Zealand. It posits that contrary 
to first impressions a dominant assessment approach is apparent, one that 
successfully manages the difficulties inherent in the ‘problem of other peoples’ 
minds’ and addresses land use conflicts in a principled, equitable manner. 
Further, it cautions that the legislature should be wary of attempting to tinker, 
as it has done latterly, with this common law approach. To do so not only risks 
corroding the sound principles formulated by the courts but may create 
inequities between citizens that are incapable of justification. To render the 
arguments less amorphous, various scenarios are explored and set within the 
fictional village of ‘Totoimano’.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
… we know that when the tide of knowledge cannot submerge opinion in its 
cleansing flow, then those unreachable lands and islands remain part of the Empire 
of Prejudice … 
— Janet Frame1 
Within the shadow of the Totoimano is a village, populated by ‘ordinary’ 
people. If we go there now we will see some of them. There is Amee, pushing 
her new baby, and pulling her young son along to school. She calls hello to 
Tame who is watching the damson shadows on his mountain change to lilac, 
and he smiles back. But they both ignore Jan passing by, a newcomer from up 
North accompanied, so the rumours go, by an unsavoury past.  
The morning quiet is broken by Mrs Fret, who opens her window, waves 
the local paper and shouts, “Tame, hoi Tame, they’re building a resort-hotel 
right by the mountain, right by your mountain”. Mrs Fret is right. A 
consortium has applied for resource consent to build a golf course-resort and 
hotel just on the outskirts of the village. The resort will change their village 
beyond recognition; it will bring tourists and traffic and jobs and money. Some 
of the villagers are pleased and some are not, but all feel strongly. The primary 
                                                          
* Faculty of Law, University of Otago, New Zealand. I would like to thank John Dawson, 
Nicola Wheen and an anonymous reviewer for their generosity in sharing their time and 
wisdom with me in the preparation of this article. All opinions and mistakes are, of course, my 
own. 
1 Living in the Maniototo (The Women’s Press, London, 1981) at 144. 
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school has been told that a new telecommunications mast will be built on the 
land at the back of the school to provide increased phone coverage and the 
schoolchildren’s parents are anxious. The hotel will be built in the lea of the 
mountain, where Tame’s kaitiaki taniwha2 resides and he is fearful for the 
mana of his place. Of our four ‘ordinary’ people, only one sees this as an 
opportunity. “Those lonely men stuck up here for meetings,” Jan thinks, 
“might need some company.” 
These people are part of this environment and the coming changes will 
change them. The new developments will affect how the inhabitants feel about 
their home and for some this will be overwhelmingly negative. Is this 
important? The developments will require regulatory consent and the villagers 
will be able to participate in the decision-making process but will those 
deciding whether to allow the resort and mast (and Jan’s embryonic business-
enterprise) consider the emotional responses of the villagers to these 
proposals? Within the New Zealand context, yes, they will, but not all 
psychological effects are equal and, as we shall see, how the catalysts or 
stimuli for those responses are categorised is critical.  
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LAW 
In our fact scenario we can assume that the developers of the resort will have 
to apply for resource consents enabling them to carry out the necessary works. 
The Resource Management Act sets down criteria to be considered by the 
court3 in making a determination about resource consent applications4 and the 
court must, amongst other things, consider the “actual and potential effects on 
the environment of allowing the activity”. The Act acknowledges people as 
part of the environment5 and case law establishes that psychological effects or 
the emotional responses of people to developments will constitute a valid 
resource management concern.6 
Most resource management cases that have addressed psychological effects 
do so in a rather monotypic fashion. Reference is made to the opponent 
suffering from “fear” or “anxiety” or the more generic “stress”7and the court 
attempts, as best it can on the evidence, to gauge the severity and potential 
                                                          
2 Translated as guardian spirit. 
3 In most cases a local authority consent authority will hear resource consent applications in the 
first instance and the Environment Court will hear appeals from that decision de novo, 
however I refer to “the court” throughout to connote the generic decision-maker for 
simplicity. 
4 Resource Management Act 1991, s 104(1). 
5 Resource Management Act 1991, s 2: definition of environment includes “people and 
communities”; and see Zdrahal v Wellington City Council [1995] 1 NZLR 700 (HC) at 708 
per Greig J: “[T]he resource management legislation intends that the environment includes the 
people, and must give them in this particular context predominant significance.”  
6 See for example: Meadow Mushrooms Ltd v Paparua County Council (1977) 6 NZTPA 327 
(TCPAB); Duncan v Thames Coromandel District Council (1980) 7 NZTPA 65 (HC); 
Edgeware Service Station v Christchurch City Council (1984) 10 NZTPA 33 (PT); Allens 
Service Station Ltd v Glen Eden Borough Council (1985) 10 NZTPA 400 (HC); Department 
of Corrections v Dunedin City Council EnvC Dunedin C131/97, 19 December 1997. 
7 See for example Orica Mining Services New Zealand Ltd v Franklin District Council EnvC 
Wellington W032/09, 5 May 2009 at [11] and [51]. 
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persistency of the effect. None of the cases enter into any detailed discussion 
about the difficulties inherent in accounting for psychological effects and, 
perhaps wisely, there is no attempt to provoke a general understanding of the 
phenomenon of psychological effects or emotion, a complex, multi-faceted 
area. Certainly, no single definition could adequately capture the meaning of 
emotion; a fuller understanding requires insights from psychology, neurology, 
anthropology and philosophy amongst other disciplines.8 Each of those 
disciplines offer varying approaches to understanding the causes, features and 
full effects of different emotional states9 but there are certain important 
characteristics of emotions that most scholars now agree on and that are 
important for legal analysis.10 Critically, and despite the long-held belief 
within the law that emotions are unreliable and should be mistrusted as 
‘irrational’ responses to stimuli,11 emotional responses are seldom if ever 
irrational in a true sense. On the contrary, emotions are inseparable from 
reasoning.12 Emotional responses will nearly always be subjectively rational 
because they are based on complex cognition; that is, an evaluative judgment 
of one’s situation. A set of facts, or more accurately, belief about facts will 
stimulate an emotional response and that response, both in terms of how it will 
be categorised (as anger, anxiety or fear, etc.) and its severity, duration and 
effects, will depend upon the appraisal made by the individual and the 
importance that they place upon the belief. In general terms however, the 
underlying cognition may be deemed objectively irrational for one of two 
reasons: the reasoning may be flawed in that it cannot be justified logically, for 
example it is based on mistaken facts, lack of knowledge or erroneous 
judgement; or, alternatively, it may not be normative (in the sense of reflecting 
customary behaviour or beliefs) and may be considered counter-majoritarian.13 
                                                          
8 See Susan A Bandes (ed) The Passions of Law (New York University Press, New York, 1999) 
at 7–8. 
9 See Robert C Solomon (ed) What is an Emotion? Classic and Contemporary Readings (2nd 
ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003). 
10 Lazarus notes that it is accepted that emotional arousal causes profound physiological changes 
by secreting hormones from the cortex and medulla of the adrenal glands and that, “… when 
too much of any hormone is secreted into the bloodstream, or if these hormones remain in the 
body for too long, they can result in harm to the tissues …”: see R S Lazarus and B N Lazarus 
Passion and Reason: Making Sense of our Emotions (Oxford University Press, New York, 
1994) at 183–184 and further see chapter 12 “Emotions and our health” at 239–261. 
11 See Bandes, above n 8, at 1–15. 
12 See for example Lazarus, above n 10; anthropologists: R Shweder and R Levine (eds) Culture 
Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984); 
philosophers: Solomon, above n 9; legal philosophers: Martha C Nussbaum Hiding from 
Humanity: Disgust Shame and the Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004); Bandes, 
above n 8; William I Miller The Anatomy of Disgust (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass), 1997). 
13 This is an extreme simplification but suffices for present purposes. Note for example that 
members of the Critical Legal Studies movement criticise the whole notion of objectivity in 
law for indeterminacy, claiming that no adjudication can be wholly objective. For an 
explanation of this argument and other critiques of objectivity in law see Brian Leiter (ed) 
Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) and in 
particular Gerald J Postema “Objectivity Fit for Law” at 99–143. Further see Joan Forret “An 
Interface Between Science And Law: What is science for members of New Zealand’s 
Environment Court” (PhD Dissertation, University of Waikato, 2006) and in particular at 48–
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Accepting that emotions have an underlying cognitive basis is important in 
understanding how the courts in New Zealand have approached emotional 
effects in environmental decision-making and how the law might evolve in this 
area. A study of case law reveals that the Environment Court implicitly accepts 
that a cognitive process underlies emotional responses. Evidence as to the 
psychological effects of a proposal on respondents will be accepted and 
assessed for its veracity but thereafter it is the underlying cognitive process 
that is scrutinised. It is at this point in a decision that the objective test enters.14 
The court considers the reasoning process that underlies the emotion and, in 
considering those underlying thoughts and beliefs, will judge whether they are 
objectively rational or irrational. Depending on the fact scenario, the court 
employs one or other of the general reasons in assessing whether the 
underlying cognition is objectively irrational. If the cognition is deemed 
irrational, the resulting emotional effects will not attract any weight in the 
decision-making process. The most interesting scenarios arise where the 
cognition is normative but incapable of logical justification; or, conversely, 
objectively rational but not normative. In those circumstances the choice as to 
the reasoning to employ to test rationality (logic versus normative reasoning) 
will critically influence the weight given to psychological effects.  
This article surveys the approach of the court in different fact scenarios. It 
posits that the dominant assessment approach is one based on logical 
assessment and suggests that this approach has particular advantages over the 
normative in the context of resource management law. Further, it questions 
whether the logical assessment approach should be applied consistently to all 
cases where opponents claim they will suffer from psychological effects, but, 
ultimately, concludes that certain exceptions to the logical assessment 
approach may be justified.  
To test how we assess the cognition underlying psychological effects in 
environmental decision-making, and in those interesting scenarios in 
particular, we can return to the Totoimano.  
III. THE PARENTS 
Amee is extremely concerned about the prospect of a telecommunications mast 
being erected on land next to the primary school. The mast will emit electro-
magnetic radiation (EMR) and Amee wants to know what the health effects 
could be for her son and the other children. The School Board arranges a 
meeting for the parents and invites a respected scientist to attend. The meeting 
does not go well. Amee asks the scientist what effects have been linked to 
EMR from masts and is told that some research suggests an increased risk of 
                                                                                                                               
55 for an explanation of the contested paradigms of objectivity in the context of scientific 
evidence. 
14 If the cognition underlying the psychological response is objectively rational, then arguably 
the actual degree of the effects on particular people should be accepted in their entirety. The 
particular characteristic of the receiving environment, it’s sensitivity or otherwise, is always 
relevant in resource management decision-making and likewise, the precise manifestations 
within individuals should be taken into account. This enables the law to acknowledge the 
variables in human psychology, and the rich diversity that makes-up humanity in all its ‘messy 
individualism’, without sacrificing an underlying consistency and reason. 
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learning disorders, sleeplessness and incidents of childhood leukemia but, the 
scientist says, the science is not clear and these risks are likely to be very low. 
One of the fathers shouts out “Can you tell me that it’s safe and there is no risk 
to my boy?” “No,” replies the scientist, “we could never say that, but it’s 
highly unlikely any of the children’s health would suffer.” “Yeah,” shouts the 
angry father, “you scientists said that about Thalidomide and mad-cow disease 
too.” Amee is extremely upset, as are many of the other parents. She cannot 
stop thinking about the potential harm, a cancer risk even, and because of her 
love and desire to protect her son from harm, this makes her extremely 
anxious. Amee discusses with her husband the prospect of moving her son 
from the school but, given their isolation, this would mean moving the whole 
family to a different area and losing their home, family support and her 
husband’s job. Their choices are extremely limited and this adds to the stress 
that Amee experiences. Amee’s anxiety is deeply felt and genuine and her 
response to the situation cannot be termed irrational; on the contrary, it is a 
subjectively rational response and many of the parents feel the same way, and 
the most effective methods of controlling adverse emotional responses (such as 
moving away from the threat) will be difficult to utilise when you have limited 
influence over outcomes and your options are few. 
There can be little doubt that the normative response of most parents would 
be the same and would probably remain unchanged regardless of the expert 
opinion evidence given and the assessment of risk made by the court. 
Researchers have explained this phenomenon in various ways15 but it is 
inaccurate to classify this unwillingness or inability to accept majority 
scientific opinion as irrational per se; rather it connotes a “conflict over what is 
the available science and how it should be evaluated”16and the degree of risk 
that should be accepted. It is also a reflection that our approach to risk mirrors 
values. As Professor Cotgrove wrote in response to Lord Rothschild’s criticism 
of “eco-nuts”:17 
The acceptability of risk cannot be isolated from values. We take incalculable risks 
to save the life of a child. To cross the road, presumably even Lord Rothschild 
seeks zero risk. Where he and the environmentalists differ so passionately is for 
what goals, and to promote what kind of society, it is worth taking particular risks. 
Both are from this perspective rational. 
Why should parents accept any risk, no matter how small, to their children’s 
health, where there is little or no direct benefit to their families? And if such 
risks are imposed upon them, and continue on a daily basis, it is easy to 
understand the resulting anxiety.  
But as the Environment Court explained in Shirley Primary School v 
Christchurch City Council, “such fears can only be given weight if they are 
                                                          
15 See for example D Kahan and others “Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein 
on Risk” (2006) 119 Harvard Law Review 1071; compare to C Sunstein Laws of Fear: 
Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005). Note 
also Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council [1999] NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [233]. 
16 Elizabeth Fisher Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2007) at 16.  
17 See letter from Professor Cotgrove replying to Lord Rothschild, The Times (November 27 
1978), quoted in Patrick McAuslan The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press, Oxford, 
1980) at 7. 
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reasonably based on real risk”.18 If, for example, the court finds that whilst one 
cannot rule out a risk,19any risk is infinitesimal, particularly compared to risks 
we take every day with our children (driving them in the car for example), the 
court will determine that the risk is of an acceptable level. As a result, the court 
will determine that flawed reasoning produces the adverse emotional response 
of the parents. In the context of EMR, the court assesses the cognition by 
considering whether the reasoning is logical or whether, on the other hand, the 
emotional response is based on an erroneous judgement. The risk assessment 
conducted by the court is decisive and that assessment is based on rational 
inquiry and a logical analysis of the scientific evidence.20 If the cognition is 
objectively irrational, the resulting psychological effects will carry no weight 
in the final decision-making process.21 
But what if Amee’s anxiety is to a greater or lesser degree shared by the 
majority of the community? Or what if all the villagers are fearful for the 
health of their tamariki? Will misguided albeit normative cognition be 
accepted as validating the emotional response in these circumstances? 
Although the court has not had to decide such a case, it is unlikely that this 
would alter the evaluative approach. The Environment Court commented in 
Shirley Primary School that even “sufficient people to be regarded as a 
community would be unlikely to persuade … the Court that consent should be 
refused, because the … stance is unreasonable.”22 
                                                          
18 Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council [1999] NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [193]. 
Note that s 3(f) of the Resource Management Act 1991 entitles decision-makers to take into 
account “any potential effect of low probability that has a high potential impact”. For a full 
explanation of the meaning of “real risk” in this context see Shirley at [11]–[13], [146]–[151] 
and [175]–[180] and [142] where the court explained: “in the case of any hypothesis about a 
high impact risk a scintilla of evidence may be all that needs to be established”, and [147]: 
“[T]o fall within section 3(f) of the Act as a potential effect of low probability and high 
potential impact an effect must not simply be a hypothesis: there must be some evidence 
supporting the hypothesis. This evidence may consist of at least one of: (1) consistent sound 
statistical studies of a human population; or (2) general expert acceptance of a hypothesis; or 
(3) persuasive animal studies or other bio-mechanistic evidence accompanied by an 
explanation as to why there is no epidemiological evidence of actual effects in the real world; 
or (4) (possibly) a very persuasive expert opinion.” For a comprehensive analysis of risk 
assessment in resource management proceedings prior to 2002 see R J Somerville QC Risk, 
Regulation, and the Resource Management Act 1991: The Case of Electricity Generation and 
Transmission (PhD Dissertation, University of Otago, August 2001).  
19 Note the court will never be able to determine that no risk at all exists; science cannot prove a 
negative. 
20 In terms of assessing technological risk, the Environment Court has always adopted an 
approach based on scientific or expert opinion evidence as opposed to ensuring the “political 
legitimacy of technical decisions in the public domain … by referring them to the widest 
democratic processes” (see H Collins and R Evans “The Third Wave of Science Studies: 
Studies of Expertise and Experience” (2002) 32 Social Studies of Science 235 at 235). For the 
difficulties inherent in each approach see for example Collins and Evans, ibid, at 236. 
21 Note a similar analysis occurs under the Hazardous Substance and New Organisms Act 1996: 
see Nicola R Wheen “Genetic Modification, Risk Assessment, and Maori Belief under New 
Zealand’s Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996” (2004) 8 APJEL 141.  
22 Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council [1999] NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [190]. 
Note the obiter comments to the contrary of the Planning Tribunal in Liquigas v Manukau City 
Council (1983) 9 NZTPA 193 (PT) at [218], a case decided under the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1977. But see Contact Energy v Waikato Regional Council (2000) 6 ELRNZ 1 
(EnvC) at [250]–[255] where the court stated: “the appeal should not be conducted as a 
political process where the extent to which parties have mobilised public opinion might 
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Why have the courts adopted this approach? Firstly, there are valid policy 
arguments as to why we do not adopt the normative approach in assessing the 
underlying cognition of psychological effects in the EMR situation. 
Specifically, to hold technological developments hostage to the suspicions of 
the masses will stifle invention and development. For the fears of the majority 
to prove determinative, when those fears flow from misunderstanding, would 
reverse progress in many areas of life. But from a wider perspective, and 
putting aside the EMR fact scenario, there is a clear danger in regulators 
accepting the irrational normative because it legitimises suspicions and 
ignorance. When a regulatory regime has particular relevance in influencing 
social conditions and the operation of communities, as resource management 
regulation does, this difficulty can become acute. The irrational normative 
engenders prejudice against others (and their activities) who may not be 
‘harmful’, but may be considered ‘different’. Such prejudice may be positive 
(all Welsh people are good singers) or it may be negative (the Scots are not 
generous with money); it may be subjectively rational (all the Welsh ‘X’ 
knows are good singers; his family believe the same; all Welsh legends have a 
tuneful bard) but it is not the truth and to accept it as such will create problems 
(if, based on my Welsh heritage, you asked me to sing it would be an 
unpleasant experience for all). In fact, the normative, as Foucault wrote, is 
inherently value-laden:23 
… normalisation becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the 
classical age. For the marks that once indicated status, privilege and affiliation were 
increasingly replaced – or at least supplemented – by a whole range of degrees of 
normality indicating membership of a homogenous social body but also playing a 
part in classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank. 
From the perspective of social equity, just blindly accepting the preferences 
of the dominant group reinforces the advantages of the already privileged and 
preserves their mores and it is a trite argument that such an approach would 
not protect minorities. On the contrary, it would stifle diversity and in the 
context of community planning some theorists argue this would lead to 
unappealing homogeneity, ghettos and the ultimate decay of communities.24 
Secondly, there are causation difficulties with the psychological effects in 
the EMR scenario.25 What is causing the anxiety in the parents? Strictly-
                                                                                                                               
influence the outcome”; and Morgan v Marlborough District Council EnvC Christchurch 
W62/2000, 4 October 2000 at [133]–[134] endorsing these comments.  
23 M Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (translated by Alan Sheridan, 
Vintage Books, New York, 1979) at 184, quoted in Mayo Moran Rethinking the Reasonable 
Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2003) at 146; see also: Moran, ibid, at 131–163; Lord Hoffmann “Anthropomorphic 
Justice: The Reasonable Man and his Friends” (1995) 29 Law Teacher 127. 
24 See for example Jane Jacobs The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Random House, 
New York, 1961); Elenore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (eds) Writing on Cities: Henri 
Lefebvre; selected, translated and introduced by Elenore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas 
(Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge (Mass), 1996); Michael Warner The Trouble with Normal: 
Sex Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life (The Free Press, New York, 1999) at 149–194. 
25 A causal link is required not just as a factor of logic but in terms of legal principles because a 
philosophical underpinning of resource management law is that regulators should not restrict 
property rights in land unless they are used in a manner that cause adverse environmental 
effects. This rational is the basis for s 9 of the Resource Management Act 1991: see Hon 
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speaking it is the belief that their children’s health may be damaged. What is 
causing this belief? In the EMR case, the court made an assessment that there 
is no ‘real risk’ of any emanations from the telecommunications mast causing 
harm. In terms of causation therefore we must accept that it cannot be the 
applicant’s activities that provide a basis for the psychological effects.26 Rather 
the emotional response is caused by unfounded suspicion, ignorance and 
perhaps Luddite prejudices on the part of the parents. Critically, therefore, the 
causal link has been broken; the parents’ fears cannot be used to prevent the 
applicant carrying out its activity because that activity is not the cause of these 
adverse effects. And whilst for present purposes we have used an EMR fact 
scenario to illustrate the point, this approach accords with all other cases where 
the fears or other psychological effects are based upon the risk of an 
unwelcome emanation from the land, whether that concerns a technological 
risk or encompasses, for example, anti-social activities. Neighbours might be 
deeply concerned, for example, that a half-way house for probationers is to be 
sited in their midst, but only if they can demonstrate a real risk of increased 
crime in the area caused by the establishment of the home will their fears be 
given due weight in the planning decision.27 
Thirdly, we do not adopt a pure ‘might is right’ approach in any decision-
making under the Resource Management Act and if we were meant to, the Act 
would be drafted in a wholly different manner. Certainly, there would be 
practical problems in operating a democratic decision making process within 
the framework of the present statute. Whilst the Act mandates that decision-
makers must manage natural and physical resources in a way that enables 
“people and communities” to provide for their well-being, it is extremely hard 
to delimitate who or what the community might be in any given situation. The 
                                                                                                                               
Simon Upton, Third Reading of the Resource Management Bill (4 July 1991) 516 NZPD 
3018–3021. 
26 The court is speculating as to what might happen in the future; to describe this as definite or as 
fact-finding is inaccurate and would be a fiction. And this is where the complexities (and 
arguments as to the correct approach to determining acceptable risk) manifest: why should the 
parents accept this speculation? But this is not so very different from traditional findings of 
fact – they too are a legal fiction but such findings are a necessary evil of litigation; we can do 
our best to refine the process, improve evidence and decision-making to try and improve 
accuracy but we can never do away with this inherent flaw completely. A major difference 
between risk assessment and fact-finding is that at some point in the future the Environment 
Court will be proven right or wrong and this can never happen in a traditional fact-finding 
exercise (hence the increasing use of adaptive management techniques in resource 
management). Nevertheless, if the court were not able to make an assessment or that 
assessment was not respected as a basis for the ultimate decision in the case then resource 
management as a discipline would fall into paralysis. And in fact if absolute truth were the 
standard, all litigation would be rendered impotent. So we have to accept this difficulty – and 
legal fiction — if we want to permit the court to decide between competing interests and 
competing visions of sustainability in resource management cases. 
27 See, for example, applications for ‘mongrel mob’ headquarters (AA Knight v Wairoa District 
Council PT Wellington W37/90, 19 July 1990); psychiatric units (A’a v Manukau City 
Council EnvC Auckland A115/98, 24 September 1998; Hawkes Bay Hospital Board v Napier 
City Council (1986) 11 NZTPA 404 (PT)); and probation centres (Department of Corrections 
v Dunedin City Council EnvC Christchurch C131/97, 19 December 1997; Ammon v New 
Plymouth District Council EnvC Wellington W27/97, 2 April 1997; Department of 
Corrections v Gisborne District Council EnvC Auckland A57/99, 24 May 1999). For an 
interesting case from the United States, see City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Centre 
473 US 432 (5th Cir 1985). 
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Act is not concerned only with property owners or those living in the 
immediate area, nor is it concerned solely with the present generation and so, 
as theorists have explained, there are “problems of extension”.28 Even if you 
could determine the finite extent of the relevant community, it would be 
difficult to ascertain an accurate majority opinion because you cannot force 
participation. Only the predilections of those who made submissions could be 
accurately ascertained. The Act also establishes clear duties and 
responsibilities for decision-making; it is local authorities and the Environment 
Court that have been given the statutory responsibility to promote sustainable 
management and to simply make decisions based on the majority view of 
submitters would be an abrogation of those responsibilities. Whilst, for 
example, district plan making is heavily influenced by community preferences, 
legally plan-makers still have an independent responsibility to ensure that the 
purpose of the Act is met.29 And whilst those deciding resource consent 
applications can receive the results of surveys or polls to illustrate community 
preferences,30again these are not determinative because the court has the 
statutory duty to promote the purpose of the Act. Sustainable management of a 
resource is more complex than simply ascertaining community preferences as 
a consideration of the list of values in Part 2 to be addressed illustrates.31 It 
may well be that one can argue that the Resource Management Act is too 
discretionary and doesn’t constitute the real rule of law but majority opinion 
doesn’t determine results and the courts have sanctioned against ‘judgement-
by-numbers’ on many occasions. 
So, whilst in our given scenario there are genuine and understandable 
psychological effects that may well be normative, and that cannot be placated 
by court findings, they will to all intents and purposes be disregarded. If 
deemed irrational, deleterious emotional effects on the mother, or indeed on all 
the parents, just will not matter in the final analysis.32 They will not carry any 
                                                          
28 See Collins and Evans, above n 20. 
29 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 56, 59, 63(1), 72, 32. 
30 See Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 
NZLR 647 (HC); Commerce Commission v Griffins Foods Ltd [1997] DCR 797 at 806. 
Although note that the court has warned about the risks inherent with survey evidence and 
suggested following the test laid down in Imperial Group plc v William Morris Ltd [1984] 
RPC 293 (ChD) at 294; see Shirley Primary School v Christchurch City Council [1999] 
NZRMA 66 (EnvC) at [138]. 
31 Resource Management Act 1991 Part 2 contains the purpose of the Act that is “sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources”. Sustainable management is described in 
s 5(2) to mean “managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical 
resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their 
social, economic, and cultural wellbeing for their health and safety while (a) sustaining the 
potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably 
foreseeable needs of future generations; and (b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of 
air, water, soil and eco-systems; and (c) avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse 
effects of activities on the environment.” Sections 6 to 8 add to the list of values decision-
makers are to be cognisant of.  
32 At first sight, the Resource Management Act does not permit the objective assessment of 
effects. Whilst the Act expressly requires the court to conduct an objective assessment of 
effects in certain applications (for example s 314 enforcement orders) this is not the case with 
the initial fact-finding exercise to be conducted in respect of resource consent applications. 
Section 104 simply requires the court to have regards to “any actual and potential effects”. But 
it is important to appreciate that these words cannot be read in isolation. Rather they are 
December 2011 Understanding the Objective 583 
weight in deciding whether to grant the applications and, as explained, there 
are good reasons for this.  
IV. TANGATA WHENUA 
At the other end of the scale are psychological effects that may, from a secular 
perspective, be based on illogical thoughts but nevertheless as a society we 
have decided to accept as relevant to decision making.  
In the Totoimano, Tame has firm beliefs that the development will anger 
the taniwha, the kaitiaki, that protects his hapu and who resides in the land 
marked for development. Although Tame’s beliefs are based on M ori legends 
and lore, they are important to his very identity: his beliefs provide a guide as 
to how he lives his life and, he believes, only to the extent that people live by 
them do spiritual beliefs continue to have force.33 Blatantly disrespecting those 
beliefs would belittle Tame, his culture, ancestors and spirituality and an 
unsurprising response would be anger, eventually replaced by sadness and 
feelings of worthlessness. To allow the development would be tantamount to 
the society he lives in disparaging Tame’s beliefs and he is anxious for the 
mana of his people and their mauri. Tame’s cultural identity and spiritual 
beliefs – what is important to him – have been shaped by his experiences in 
life, the orderings of the society he has grown in, social gatherings, teachings 
and rituals, and so we can see how this response is subjectively rational and 
will be a response normative to his people.34 
As a statutory imperative, the relationship of M ori with their taonga, 
including their spiritual beliefs,35must be taken into account by decision-
makers in resource management proceedings.36 The High Court in Bleakley v 
Environmental Risk Management Authority acknowledged that the express 
                                                                                                                               
“subject to Part 2” of the Act and specifically the aim of the Act that natural and physical 
resources be managed in a way that (amongst other things), “enables people and communities 
to provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety”, 
values that do not always coincide in any given case. So, whilst the court will make findings 
as to all actual and potential effects, it is common for different effects to create a conflict. In 
the EMR case, for example, there will be negative effects flowing from the proposal (the 
adverse psychological effect on the parents – a health effect) but also positive effects (the 
increased telecommunications coverage in the area – a social and economic effect). In 
determining how best to promote sustainable management of the land in question, invariably 
the court will have to declare a preference (on this see J G Fogarty “Giving Effect to Values in 
Statutes” in J Finn and S Todd (eds) Law, Liberty and Legislation: Essays in Honour of John 
Burrows QC (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008)). Assessing whether psychological effects are 
irrational assists in this process by enabling the court to attach little if any weight to them.  
33 See R Shweder and R Levine (eds) Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self and Emotion 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) at 193. 
34 Whilst cultural influence is “not monolithic” it is considered substantial in stimulating an 
emotional response: see Lazarus, above n 10, at 195.  
35 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 (HC) at 233.  
36 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 5(2), 6(e), 7(a) and 8. The main difficulty for M ori is 
how much weight these effects will be given in the final decision-making process if there are 
conflicting values; see IH Williams “The Minister’s Prison and the Cultural Prison: Lessons 
from the Northland Prison Litigation” (2003) 20 NZULR 320. 
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statutory reference to taonga requires cognisance of beliefs central to M ori 
culture, including intangible spiritual beliefs, and commented:37 
The Resource Management Act does for the most part deal with physical objects, 
although on occasion needing to consider Maori cultural and spiritual beliefs 
associated with those physical objects. It is not an area where intangible cultural 
and spiritual beliefs often fall for consideration in their own right. 
M ori cultural and spiritual beliefs are considered to have particular relevance 
to environmental management and other people’s use of natural objects 
(whereas, for instance, Christian beliefs are not38) because of the animist 
features of M ori spirituality and the concept of whakapapa. The meaning of 
‘Maori relationship with their taonga’39 constitutes a number of facets 
(including kaitiakitanga) but will also include the right to hold beliefs and to 
know that they are respected. Such beliefs certainly cannot garner any 
scientific support or clear documented evidence to show that they are true but 
as Schweder explains, rather than deeming them irrational, these spiritual 
beliefs are better described as non-rational thoughts, that is: “ideas that fall 
beyond the scope of scientific evaluation”.40 Non-rational thinking suggests 
that there is “ something more to thinking than reason and evidence – culture, 
the arbitrary, the symbolic, the expressive, the semiotic – that many of our 
ideas and practices are beyond logic and experience”.41This contrasts with the 
type of irrational thinking that we saw in the EMR scenario, described by 
Shweder as “cases of genuinely degraded performance”.42 In the EMR-type 
cases, either “the informant has failed to apply a standard that he himself 
recognizes as authoritative and correct … or the informant has failed to 
acquire the proper standard for reasoning, judgement or choice”.43 
For the court to take into account these psychological effects, M ori 
opponents must of course still show that the beliefs allegedly being 
transgressed are genuinely held and demonstrate the adverse effects that flow. 
Assuming that this evidential hurdle is passed, however, the court cannot 
render the resulting psychological effects weightless by looking at the 
rationality of the underlying cognition. The courts do not investigate the 
historical proof of whether, for example, the mountain actually was the home 
                                                          
37 Bleakley v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 (HC) at 234. 
38 Although see Grunke v Otago Regional Council PT Christchurch C8/96, 11 March 1996, an 
application for an interim enforcement order wherein Judge Skelton did not dismiss out of 
hand Sister Grunke’s objection to the use of pesticides near rivers on the basis of spiritual 
concerns. The Roman Catholic nun regarded “water as a symbol of baptism and therefore life, 
and for her polluting it turns it into a symbol of death” (at 3). Although the Judge stated, “[a]s 
for Sister Grunke’s spiritual beliefs, while I accept them as genuine from her point of view, I 
cannot accept on an objective basis that they should carry the weight that again would be 
necessary to enable either application to succeed” (at 8). The author was unable to discover 
any similar cases where non-M ori spiritual beliefs were accepted as relevant, in opposing an 
application by another party to use the environment in a particular way. 
39 Resource Management Act 1991, s 6(e). 
40 See Shweder, above n 33, at 165. 
41 Shweder, above n 33, at 38. 
42 Shweder, above n 33, at 37. 
43 Shweder, above n 33, at 37. 
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of a mythical ancestor or taniwha or whether the taniwha will be angered by 
the location of the development. In fact the court, following some initial 
confusion about this, has expressly accepted that such issues are “simply not 
justiciable”.44 Rather the courts, following the statutory mandate, are relativist 
and pluralistic, appreciating the diversity in peoples and seeking to respect 
spiritual beliefs. The basis for the belief, if that belief is genuinely held, is not 
scrutinised. 
Why do we give special protection to and ring-fence this non-rational 
thinking? Certainly, it is an approach that has attracted criticism,45 particularly 
because only M ori cultural and spiritual concerns are expressly protected in 
this way, and no doubt this will continue to be a contentious issue. But there 
are specific legal and policy reasons that can be used to provide a justification 
for this approach. The Treaty of Waitangi and the jurisprudence that has 
developed around the compact between sovereign and M ori provides a legal 
justification by establishing quasi-constitutional rights.46 But in terms of 
policy, adopting this approach is seen to have a valuable social utility, not just 
from the perspective of M ori but for all New Zealanders. It says something 
about what we stand for, what our values are as a society. It acknowledges the 
importance, to all of us, of preserving the cultural heritage of our first peoples, 
a goal that will contribute to the depth and richness of our society. Our entire 
economic and legal system is premised on and imbued with British values and 
making express provisions for M ori is an acknowledgement that we have to 
make a conscious effort to guard against the all-pervading suffocation that 
colonisation engenders, the smothering of minority indigenous cultures, 
spirituality, language, knowledge and traditions. In noting that “the aspirations 
of the Resource Management Act for the recognition of M ori values are 
expressed emphatically”, Baragwanath J reminds the courts that:47 
… the importance of due recognition of those values, clearly expressed by 
Parliament, requires an ungrudging response from the Courts. Because Maori 
history and traditions are less familiar to many judges than those of England, we 
need constantly to recall Cardozo’s advice: 
Deep below consciousness are … the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the 
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make 
the man, whether he be litigant or judge … The great tides and currents which engulf the 
rest of men do not turn aside and pass the judges by … The spirit of the age, as it is 
revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group in which the accidents of 
birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place. No effort or 
revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of these 
subconscious loyalties. The Nature of the Judicial Process Yale 1921 pp 167-8 and 
174-5.  
                                                          
44 Friends and Community of Ngawha Inc v Minister of Corrections [2002] NZRMA 401 (HC) 
at [39]. Note: Wheen argues that in the context of the Hazardous Substance and New 
Organisms Act 1996 ERMA has attempted to rationally assess M ori spiritual beliefs, see 
Wheen, above n 21. 
45 See R Ahdar “Indigenous Spiritual Concerns and the Secular State: Some New Zealand 
Developments” (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 611; D Round “Here Be Dragons” 
(2005) 11 Otago Law Review 31; compare to Williams, above n 36. 
46 See in particular Matthew Palmer The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and 
Constitution (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2008). 
47 Helmbright v Environment Court [2005] NZRMA 118 (HC) at [25]–[28]. 
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Such self-appraisal will continue to be needed so long as the importance of the Globe 
Theatre is more natural than an appreciation of the Maori tradition which is a vital 
component of our country’s history. That will be of increasing value to future generations, 
whatever the demographics. 
It is a small enough thing in resource development to take Parliament at its word 
and give substantial effect to Maori history… It has been the experience of each 
colonial society that indigenous interests have been overwhelmed by the claims of 
the colonists. That experience has been seen in both Americas, Africa and 
throughout the Pacific including Australasia. It is a problem inherent in the process 
of the Westminster system, seen in its starkest form in the apartheid regime of 
South Africa. Those in public office must examine their conduct in the way that 
Cardozo, himself of a minority, expressed so clearly.  
The protection of the indigenous people of New Zealand, now a minority, 
is at the forefront of the argument.48 Fundamentally, a case can be made that 
giving special protection to this ‘non-rational’ cognition contributes positively 
to society and making this exception has a valuable social utility. The courts 
do not subject emotions, based on M ori spiritual beliefs, to an objective, 
rational assessment; they do not investigate the logic of the underlying 
cognition49 and nor should they. In essence, we have agreed as a society to 
value and respect those spiritual beliefs; thus psychological effects flowing 
from these beliefs have been singled out as a specific exception and protected 
from the requirement that the underlying cognition be objectively rational.  
V. THE PROSTITUTE 
Now consider the case of the sex-worker. Jan is delighted at the proposal for a 
resort. Unbeknown to (most of) the villagers she has secretly been working as 
a prostitute from her home and the prospect of a steady flow of tourists and 
conference attendees has increased her potential work. She contacts another 
sex-worker she knows from Auckland, who agrees to come and work with Jan 
from her home. Following the decriminalisation of prostitution in 2003,50 the 
District Plan was amended to manage ‘prostitution related activities’ and to 
operate within the confines of the Plan, Jan needs to obtain a resource consent. 
She wouldn’t bother but as she wants to advertise to the tourists, she’ll need to 
be legitimate. Her application for resource consent is publicly notified and Mrs 
Fret is horrified, as are a number of Jan’s other neighbours. Mrs Fret’s 
response it voluble and oft repeated: “It’s disgusting,” she says. “The thought 
of it going on here in our village makes me feel sick.” 
In fact, the majority of the neighbours are opposed to resource consent 
being granted. Their opposition is twofold. They describe their primary 
opposition as a strong moral response, but it can also be categorised as 
emotion-based. The opponents hold certain beliefs that prostitution is wrong. 
Ignoring those beliefs, and allowing behaviour that is anathema to those 
                                                          
48 Note also the general legislative provision for the protection of minorities, their cultural 
practices and beliefs in the Human Rights Act 1993, s 21 and the Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
ss 19–20. 
49 Although compare to Wheen, above n 21, arguing the opposite in the context of the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority.  
50 Prostitution Reform Act 2003. 
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beliefs, causes an adverse emotional response: disgust and revulsion at the 
very thought of prostitution. The neighbours’ secondary opposition reflects 
concern at more concrete nuisance effects such as the potential for noise, late 
night operating hours, traffic, unsavoury rubbish, attracting a criminal element 
and the prospects of their property suffering from ‘environmental blight’ and a 
loss in value. This anxiety certainly looks to be based on rational cognition that 
may be testable in evidence51 and this would be the same with the 
establishment of any other business. But what of the primary opposition? How 
will objections categorised as ‘moral’ be regarded? To answer this question, it 
is necessary to know a little about the law reform concerning prostitution, 
particularly because the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 seemingly crafted the 
way that we are to think about opposition to brothels based on psychological 
effects. 
The Prostitution Reform Act can be categorised as human rights 
legislation. The aim of the legislation was to ensure equal labour and human 
rights for all New Zealanders52 and to promote the well-being of sex-
workers;53 indeed the very purpose of the Act is:54 
… to decriminalise prostitution55(whilst not endorsing or morally sanctioning 
prostitution or its use) and to create a framework that—  
(a) safeguards the human rights of sex workers and protects them from exploitation:  
(b) promotes the welfare and occupational health and safety of sex workers: 
But the reform also gave express powers to Local Authorities to regulate the 
signage for and location of brothels56 and in particular, singled out and 
specifically addressed psychological effects in resource management decision-
making. Section 15 of the Prostitution Reform Act amended the Resource 
Management Act by providing that: 
                                                          
51 General adverse effects (noise, traffic, etc) are possible with all businesses and can be 
managed by conditions on the consent, a short period granted for consent or a review of the 
operation of the consent. Effects on property prices constitute valid planning concerns but 
strong evidence must be adduced of significant effects and the court has warned that “real 
estate agents’ assessments are notoriously variable … market conditions at the time of sale are 
unpredictable, but much more likely to be the predominant influence” (Little Sydney Mining 
Co v Tasman District Council [2010] NZEnvC 302 at [93]). The court will look for persuasive 
evidence rather than mere apocryphal tales and the conclusions of the Prostitution Law 
Review Committee (Ministry of Justice Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on 
the Operation of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington, 2008)) may be important in 
helping a court determine this issue.  
52 Katherine Rich (National) (19 February 2003) 606 NZPD 3609–3610. 
53 Tim Barnett (Labour) (19 February 2003) 606 NZPD 3607-3609. 
54 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s 3. 
55 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, s 4(1): Prostitution means the provisions of commercial sexual 
services. 
56 Prostitution Reform Act 2003, ss 12–15, empowering Local Authorities through bylaw 
provisions to prohibit or otherwise regulate signage and to regulate (but not prohibit) the 
location of brothels and confirming their powers to regulate location via the District Plan. 
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15  Resource consents in relation to businesses of prostitution 
(1) When considering an application for a resource consent under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 for a land use relating to a business of prostitution, a 
territorial authority must have regard to whether the business of prostitution— 
(a) is likely to cause a nuisance or serious offence to ordinary members of the 
public using the area in which the land is situated; or 
(b) is incompatible with the existing character or use of the area in which the 
land is situated. 
So, in determining whether to grant Jan’s application, decision-makers must 
consider whether the thought of prostitution would cause serious offence to 
ordinary members of the public using the area: these psychological effects can 
be considered even in the absence of any external manifestations from the 
business. There is no attempt to explain the meaning of “serious offence” in 
the statute but within the criminal sphere, case law in Australasia has 
established that “offensive behaviour” is tested by the psychological effect it 
creates in the objective perceiver thus providing a useful guide in the present 
context. Offensive behaviour must be such as to “wound the feelings, arouse 
anger or resentment or disgust or outrage in the mind of a reasonable 
person.”57 Within Resource Management Act enforcement proceedings, the 
High Court cited this formula with approval in a case concerning the meaning 
of the phrase “objectionable and offensive”.58 So, “offence” stimulates a 
particular emotional response that we would categorise and describe as “anger, 
disgust, resentment or outrage”. But the criminal law formula also imports the 
reasonable person test into the equation: an ordinary person, faced with that 
stimulus, would respond in this particular way. The wording of the Prostitution 
Reform Act also makes it clear that the court must carry out an objective 
assessment of that particular psychological response.  
In another Resource Management Act case concerning potentially 
offensive behaviour, the Court of Appeal has explained that in undertaking an 
objective assessment: 59 
… the Court acts as the representative of the community at large. In that capacity 
the Court must decide whether the claim of the objector to find the subjectmatter 
offensive or objectionable is a justified one. … The Court must weigh all the 
relevant competing considerations and ultimately make a value judgment on behalf 
of the community as a whole. 
But this is not a very satisfactory answer and the question remains as to 
how the court assesses whether the emotional response is “justified”: is the 
court still permitted to consider the underlying cognition, and to make an 
                                                          
57 Ceramulus v Police (1991) 7 CRNZ 678 (HC) at 682–683. 
58 Zdrahal v Wellington City Council [1995] 1 NZLR 700 (HC). 
59 Watercare Services Ltd v Minhinnick [1998] 1 NZLR 294 (CA) at 304–305 per Tipping J. 
This reflects the test adopted in other regulatory regimes concerning, for example, cases 
brought under the Food and Drug Act 1969 (Flint v Hellaby Peach Products [1974] 1 NZLR 
718 (SC)), Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (implicit in Bleakley v 
Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 NZLR 213 (HC) at 238–239) as well as 
the criminal cases of offensive behaviour.  
December 2011 Understanding the Objective 589 
assessment as to whether that emotional response is rational or irrational?60 
This would certainly accord with the general approach taken by the courts in 
resource management proceedings. If so, should an assessment be based on 
logical or normative reasoning?  
In trying to answer the questions posed, it may be important to 
acknowledge the difference between risk-based cases concerning emanations 
(for example, EMR scenarios) compared to claims of adverse psychological 
effects caused by the mere knowledge of an activity taking-place. The former 
may be subject to rigorous scientific analysis, expert evidence as to probability 
and a decision made as to whether the risk is real. Evidentially, the latter is 
rather more amorphous. Is it possible to use a logical, rational assessment to 
test the underlying cognition in cases that are not susceptible to scientific 
analysis? Fortunately, the courts have dealt with a number of mere knowledge 
cases where opponents have argued that the activity, even in the event of it 
functioning properly, will cause them to suffer adverse psychological effects. 
Most examples include applications for nudist camps and funeral parlours.61 In 
the majority of cases (and absent more compelling adverse effects) the court 
has adopted a robust approach, rejected the opposition and consented to the 
activities. There are clear policy reasons for this best expressed perhaps by 
Judge Sheppard in a case concerning an application for a nudist camp: 62 
It is our understanding that tolerance of a variety of attitudes is evidence of healthy 
social conditions in a free and democratic society … [I]f the practice of nudity on 
the applicant’s own private property in circumstances where it is not displayed to 
                                                          
60 Note that the High Court in Mount Victoria Residents Association Inc v Wellington City 
Council HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-1820, 5 March 2009 per Dobson J, found that s 15 of 
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 meant an application for resource consent for a brothel must 
be notified to the public to ensure public participation in the decision making process but the 
Court did not answer how the consent authority was to approach the objective test once it had 
received any evidence of psychological effects. Note also that the by-law making power under 
the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 has been the subject of judicial review (see Conley v 
Hamilton City Council [2007] NZCA 543; Willowford Family Trust v Christchurch City 
Council [2006] 1 NZLR 791 (HC); JB International Ltd v Auckland City Council HC 
Auckland CIV-2005-404-2214, 14 March 2006). However none of these cases illuminate the 
issue at hand. 
61 See for example McQueen v Waikato District Council PT Auckland A45/94, 20 June 1994; 
Tainui Investments v Waimea County Council (1981) 8 NZTPA 65 (PT); Cook Islands 
Community Centre (HB) Inc v Hastings District Council [1994] NZRMA 375 (PT); Gateway 
Funeral Services v Whakatane District Council EnvC Wellington W005/08, 5 February 2008; 
Sanddown Developments Ltd v Rodney County Council Town and Country Planning Appeal 
Board 292/76, 300/76, 5 October 1976. 
62 McQueen v Waikato District Council PT Auckland A45/94, 20 June 1994 at 6. Critically, 
Judge Sheppard alludes to a major difficulty with mere knowledge cases: causation. If mere 
knowledge of the activity taking place causes certain sensitive souls to become distressed, 
whilst other more robust individuals remain unmoved, has the activity caused the effect? This 
constitutes an interesting discussion that is beyond the scope of this brief paper. Note that 
Judge Sheppard in McQueen also tantalisingly adds: “Nudity as such is not illegal, nor is it 
generally regarded in this country as immoral … the fact that some residents of the 
neighbourhood of an activity find that activity embarrassing, objectionable or unacceptable 
does not necessarily amount to an effect of the activity on the social or cultural conditions 
which affect the community…” (at 5–6), but he does not suggest what might be the result if 
the activity was generally regarded as immoral but not criminal. Could the adverse effects 
flowing from the mere knowledge that party-pills (presently a legal activity) were to be 
produced next door be enough to prevent a successful resource consent application?  
590 New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol 24 
others is embarrassing or objectionable to residents of the locality, or to others in 
the vicinity, any adverse social effects of that may be the result of those attitudes, 
rather than an effect of the nudity. 
In this judgment, and in similar cases,63 the irritation of the judge is almost 
palpable and one can sense echoes of the suspicions expressed by John Stuart 
Mill with regards to “the good faith of the parties who claim to need protection 
of their own sensibilities from the self-regarding conduct of others.”64 
There is one notable exception to this general trend concerning mere 
knowledge cases, however, which is important for our present discussion. In 
the case of Cook Island Community Centre Society (HB) Inc v Hastings 
District Council65 the Court refused an application in relation to a funeral 
parlour. The parlour was to be sited directly across the road from a cultural 
centre for Cook Island people. The popular centre had taken 14 years to 
complete and was used for a whole range of activities and celebrations, 
including weddings, sports events and cultural nights. The Cook Islanders 
argued that their mere knowledge of a body lying in the neighbouring funeral 
parlour would serve to curtail much of the celebratory activities within the 
centre. Given that death was unpredictable, a body could unexpectedly be 
within the funeral parlour at a time when an event planned for many months 
was scheduled. To all intents and purposes consenting to the funeral parlour 
would signal the demise of the centre. Implicit in the judgement was an 
assessment of the cognition underlying the psychological response of the Cook 
Islanders. The normative assessment approach is clear and evident. The court 
refused to find the Cook Islanders “hypersensitive” and accepted rather that 
most civilisations believe it is inappropriate to “behave irreverently close to a 
place where a deceased person may be if one is aware of the presence of that 
person.”66 But it is not too difficult to supply an argument based on reasoning: 
we will all become mourners at some point in our lives, a difficult process for 
most of us, and there is a clear social utility in “revering” the dead and 
respecting the sensitivities of mourners. Potentially both a normative and a 
rational assessment approach could be used in this case and certainly the 
rational argument can be used to underpin a valuable moral code. Clearly, it is 
possible to undertake rational inquiry to justify a response based on mere 
knowledge or ‘moral’ belief, although it may not be evidence from the 
                                                          
63 For an example of the court rejecting concerns about the influence in society of an ‘alternative 
community’ see Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v Takapuna City Council (1978) 6 
NZTPA 503 (PT). 
64 Joel Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Volume Two Offence to Others (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1985) at 63, paraphrasing J S Mill On Liberty (Bobbs-Merrill Co, 
Indianapolis, c1956) chapter 4 at [12]. 
65 Cook Islands Community Centre (HB) Inc v Hastings District Council [1994] NZRMA 375 
(PT). 
66 Cook Islands Community Centre (HB) Inc v Hastings District Council [1994] NZRMA 375 
(PT) at 380. It is also important to note that the degree of harm likely to be caused (ie the 
demise of the centre) was instrumental in the decision to refuse consent but that is not an issue 
that goes to assessing underlying cognition. Rather it goes to the second stage of assessing 
psychological effects, ie a consideration of the actual psychological harm caused, its severity 
and other implications that flow from this; see above n 14. 
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physical sciences that is adduced but rather socio-political debate from social 
scientists and philosophers.67 
Returning to our present case, should the court look for a rational 
justification? This would bring considerations concerning prostitution into line 
with how we deal with emanations (and opponents may seek to argue that the 
corrupting influence of prostitution emanates outwards) but in practice this 
may well cause difficulties. How would you logically justify the underlying 
cognition? In her writings on the topic,68 Martha Nussbaum carefully and 
persuasively dismantles the most popular ‘reasons’ for opposition to 
prostitution. She suggests that the disapprobation of prostitution is propped up 
by irrational prejudice and a collection of vague, undifferentiated fears, 
incapable of providing any logical justification. Historically, prostitution was 
thought immoral because “non-reproductive and extra-marital sex” was 
considered immoral,69 an unpersuasive reason in modern times, and the 
prejudice against prostitutes (that interestingly is a relatively modern 
phenomenon, not apparent in antiquity) was intertwined with a general unease 
about ‘the body’, the prevailing subrogation of women and their sexuality, and 
a class prejudice against tradespeople. Nussbaum argues that “[t]here’s nothing 
wrong per se with taking money for the use of one’s body. That’s the way that 
most of us live”, including Professors of Philosophy, and the work or “service 
expresses something intimate about the self”70 in a myriad of occupations. 
Many of the major difficulties71 concerning prostitution are caused by its 
traditional status as a criminal activity and you can find the same problems 
with other activities that attract the ‘wrong-sorts’ because of their outlaw-
classification. These difficulties are obviated by decriminalisation.72 
Opponents to prostitution frequently cite religious teachings but relying upon 
religious dogma that provokes intolerance towards certain classes leads, she 
warns, into dangerous territory, and as an alternative, feminist arguments as to 
                                                          
67 See below n 75: the court received evidence from philosophers in Romer v Evans 517 US 620 
(1996). 
68 Martha C Nussbaum Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999); 
Martha C Nussbaum Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2004); “‘Secret Sewers of Vice’: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law” 
in Susan A Bandes (ed) The Passions of Law (New York University Press, New York, 1999), 
at 19–62. Compare Nussbaum’s general argument about disgust being an inappropriate driver 
for regulation with Richard Posner “Emotion versus Emotionalism in the Law” in Susan A 
Bandes (ed) The Passions of Law (New York University Press, New York, 1999) at 309–329, 
who argues that disgust when normative is a valuable barometer of societal morality, and Dan 
Kahan “The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust” in Susan A Bandes (ed) The Passions of 
Law (New York University Press, New York, 1999) at 63–79, who writes that this emotional 
response can positively influence community norms. 
69 Martha C Nussbaum Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) at 
286. 
70 Ibid, at 292. 
71 For example, being a conduit for the activities of criminal gangs, drug dealing, violence, 
trafficking in people, and underage prostitution. See also Joanna Phoenix (ed) Regulating Sex 
for Sale Prostitution Policy Reform in the UK (The Policy Press, Bristol, 2009) arguing that 
such criminal activities often have an incorrect metonymical association with prostitution (at 
6–12). 
72 Martha C Nussbaum Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) at 
288, 294. 
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the commodification of women simply don’t pass muster.73 Whilst good 
reasoning upholds valuable moral codes, subjected to the bright spotlight of 
Nussbaum’s scrutiny the so-called moral opposition to prostitution withers, 
feebly.  
Returning to more earthly realms, and our present scenario, opponents to 
Jan’s business may proffer ‘concrete’ reasons, to suggest that disapprobation 
has a social utility. Perhaps they would seek to argue that legitimised 
prostitution in communities causes marriage break-ups, corrupts the innocent 
minds of our (twenty-first century) children and draws ever more young people 
into the industry. But if empirical evidence exists to support such claims, it 
was not unearthed during a five-year governmental review into prostitution 
post-decriminalisation.74 Absent such evidence, it would be hard to justify 
discrimination on social utility grounds. A good illustration of this point comes 
from the United States: the State of Colorado encountered horrendous 
problems in court trying to justify as rational laws that were found to 
discriminate against homosexuals.75 We can assume, and rightly I believe, that 
it will be a difficult task to shore up the emotional response to prostitution per-
se with logic. But despite the potential difficulties, if the underlying cognition 
is to be assessed this may be the only assessment approach to adopt when the 
alternative is considered. 
So, what of the normative assessment approach? Should the court look to 
whether disapprobation of prostitution is majoritarian? But using this as a 
backstop causes problems: it is saying ‘emotional responses to prostitution that 
can not be rationally or logically justified are acceptable if the majority feel the 
same’ and in respect of prostitution, context is critical. In the context of human 
rights reform and legislation – when we have adopted a top-down approach to 
protecting an unpopular minority – could this ever be a valid approach for a 
court to take? I would argue not. To interpret the legislation in a way that 
permitted this approach would result in the state-sponsored stigma of a 
minority: the complete antithesis to the legislation. Absent tangible nuisance 
effects, prostitutes, and only prostitutes, would face greater restrictions in 
carrying out their legal business activities compared to any other business, 
simply because others do not like the thought of what they are doing, 
consensually, in private, despite those thoughts having no reasonable, logical 
basis. Permitting this approach says ‘prostitutes and their practices are the least 
desirable members of our community and we will sanction them being 
prejudiced against even if that prejudice is irrational’. It is setting up, by the 
use of law, a hierarchy in society and right at the bottom of the heap would be 
the very people, the marginalised minority, that the Prostitution Reform Act 
sought to protect. Prostitution is not a criminal activity and I do not believe 
                                                          
73 Ibid, at 291–293. 
74 Ministry of Justice Report of the Prostitution Law Review Committee on the Operation of the 
Prostitution Reform Act 2003 (Wellington 2008). 
75 Romer v Evans 517 US 620 (1996) and see (1996) 110 Harv L Rev 155 for a note of the case; 
Martha C Nussbaum Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) at 
301–302; Martha C Nussbaum Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004) at 150. 
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that the state has any role in reinforcing damaging prejudices against non-
criminal actors.76 
Clearly, the above arguments are premised on the basis that a court would 
scrutinise the cognition underpinning the emotional response to prostitution. 
But an alternative understanding of s 15 of the Prostitution Reform Act is that 
the court need not consider the cognition at all. The legislation might simply 
be giving moral objections to prostitution (and, I might add, only prostitution, 
not any other activity that you or I might find immoral) special standing. To 
this extent, the disapprobation of prostitution would be accorded the same 
special protection as M ori spiritual beliefs and, if genuinely felt, just accepted 
as a valid resource management concern without further scrutiny of the 
underlying cognition. If this interpretation is correct, s 15 must be read as 
containing an implicit acknowledgment that prostitution is morally wrong; the 
legislature is saying, ‘If serious offence is taken at the mere thought of 
prostitution that is perfectly justifiable and we need not examine this response 
any further.’77 Section 15 may simply reflect a political compromise reached in 
order to secure the passage of the reforming legislation and hence this 
interpretation was the one intended by parliamentarians, but if this is the 
correct approach it causes difficulties. Perhaps the least of these is an internally 
inconsistent statute, hoist on opposing policies. The major difficulty however 
is explained above. If an exception is being made to the general approach 
taken to psychological effects, this exception is not being made to protect a 
minority (as in the case of M ori) rather it is serving to undermine and, by the 
use of law, permit a damaging prejudice to continue against another vulnerable 
minority. To just accept an emotional response to the mere thought of 
prostitution (which may, as Nussbaum argues, be based on “irrational 
prejudice … vague, undifferentiated fears, incapable of providing any logical 
justification”) without permitting the court to examine the underlying 
cognition will contribute to stymieing any real reform; irrational prejudice 
against sex-workers will continue to be considered acceptable and will remain 
unabated and unchecked.  
In summary, psychological effects in the context of prostitution are 
troubling and the drafting of the statute does not lend itself clearly to one 
interpretation. Given this lack of clarity, a persuasive argument can be made 
that a court should scrutinise the cognition underlying the emotional response, 
and should assess this cognition from the perspective of logic and reasoning. 
This would result in a consistent legal approach: it would ensure greater 
consistency to the approach taken to psychological effects in resource 
                                                          
76 For a more detailed discussion of the damage this can cause to sex-workers see A C Warnock 
and N R Wheen “Prostitution in New Zealand: The Re-importation of Moral Majoritarianism 
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management; and it would ensure an internal consistency within the 
Prostitution Reform Act. It would require opponents to demonstrate that 
disapprobation of legalised prostitution has a social utility rather than giving 
them a ‘free-pass’ to irrationality. But if this is the correct approach, the 
obvious difficulty is that it would render s 15 meaningless and this in itself 
would trouble a court charged with interpreting the section. Absent any clear 
decision on the point,78 the position will remain uncertain. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At first sight, the approach to psychological effects in resource management 
decision-making appears inconsistent. If opponents find nudist camps 
offensive this will be disregarded; if they morally object to prostitution, this 
may prove determinative. If communities fear that telecommunications masts 
risk the health of their children, this fear will not carry any weight. The 
spiritual beliefs of M ori must be taken into account whilst the anxieties of 
Presbyterians as to the siting of a new religious sect will be irrelevant. But 
upon closer inspection, a dominant theme emerges. In the vast majority of 
cases the courts consider the cognition underlying the psychological effect and 
assess this objectively from the perspective of logic. If the cognition proves 
rational, the resulting psychological effects will be taken into account; if not, 
they will be disregarded. This approach enables reason and consistency to be 
imported into a sphere notoriously characterised by messy individualism and 
“endless subtleties and variations”.79 It results in an equitable approach to 
managing conflicting interests in land management, and is an approach 
underpinned by good, reasoned policy objectives. In all cases where statute 
does not dictate an alternate approach, the courts should be fully transparent as 
to the assessment they will apply to psychological effects: one that will search 
for an objectively logical explanation for the underlying cognition. This will 
assist parties to recognise the applicable tests, enable them to marshal the 
appropriate arguments and evidence, and it may well have repercussions for 
case management.  
Incursions into this common law approach have been made by the 
legislature. When such interference complements existing laws and supports a 
wider social utility, these exceptions appear justified and acceptable. For 
example, a clear case can be made that exempting the ‘non-rational’ spiritual 
beliefs of M ori from cognitive scrutiny serves to promote a positive, wider 
goal. However, when statute law has the potential to overturn the careful and 
reasoned common law approach and contradicts other laws, difficulties can 
arise. The case of sex-workers aptly illustrates this point. One interpretation of 
the Prostitution Reform Act is that logically indefensible objections to the 
mere thought of prostitution should not only remain unchallenged but will be 
influential in resource consent decision-making. The effect of this would be to 
legitimise irrational discrimination against a minority: a minority that the state 
seemingly determined deserves protection. Arguably, retaining the approach 
                                                          
78 See the comments concerning Mount Victoria Residents Association Inc v Wellington City 
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79 Susan A Bandes (ed) The Passions of Law (New York University Press, New York, 1999) at 
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developed by the courts would better manage the inherent conflict of interests 
that accompanies prostitution. Scrutinising the cognition underpinning the 
emotional response, looking for logical foundations, will ensure that valuable 
‘moral’ codes are upheld. But irrationality that simply serves to marginalise 
further a disadvantaged group would, under this court created approach, be 
disregarded.  
As a final observation, the logical assessment approach has interesting 
ramifications for the relative importance of psychological effects and the wider 
role of resource management decision-making. In cases concerning the risk of 
emanations, psychological effects are rendered practically impotent. In such 
cases, if a real risk were established the resulting psychological effects would 
be taken into account in the final decision-making process. But as the court in 
Shirley Primary School pointed out, there is a degree of artifice to this because 
the relevance of those psychological effects would pale into insignificance 
when compared to the risk to physiological health. The consents would, most 
likely, be refused because of the actual threat to health, or property in other 
cases, regardless of the anxieties of those at risk. By comparison, in the mere 
knowledge cases psychological effects assume critical importance. The proper 
application of a logical assessment test will serve to delineate between 
valuable moral codes and prejudice deemed unacceptable in a liberal 
democracy and thus the role of the court is, as Lefebre opined, to formulate 
“the problems of society into questions of space” and to transpose “all that 
comes from history and consciousness into spatial terms.”80 As a result, in the 
context of mere knowledge cases, the Environment Court is required and by 
necessity must undertake a role far in excess of that originally envisaged for it.  
                                                          
80 Elenore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (eds) Writing on Cities: Henri Lefebvre; selected, 
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